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Abstract—In this paper, we present a scheme of fully dis-
tributed resilient state estimation for linear dynamical systems
under sensor attacks. The proposed state observer consists of
a network of local observers, where each of them utilizes local
measurements and information transmitted from the neighbors.
As a fully distributed scheme, it does not necessarily collect a
majority of sensing data for the sake of attack identification,
while the compromised sensors are eventually identified by the
distributed network and excluded from the observers. For this,
the overall network (not the individual local observer) is assumed
to have redundant sensors and assumed to be connected. The
proposed scheme is based on a novel design of a distributed
median solver, which approximately recovers the median value
of local estimates.
Index Terms—analytical redundancy, attack detection, attack
resilience, cyber-physical systems, resilient state estimation, het-
erogeneous multi-agents, strong coupling, blended dynamics
I. INTRODUCTION
As control systems are more connected and become vul-
nerable to cyber-sensor-attacks [1], resilient state estimation
problem has been posed. Let the plant be given by
x˙ = Ax+Bu, (1a)
y = Cx+ a, (1b)
where x ∈ Rn is the state, u ∈ Rp is the input, y ∈ Rm is the
output, and a ∈ Rm is the attack injected to the output sensor.
Throughout the paper, we suppose that the total of m sensors is
grouped into N sensor banks, and the i-th sensor bank consists
of mi sensors so that
∑N
i=1mi = m. For convenience, each
i-th block output yi ∈ Rmi of y in (1b) is written as
yi = Cix+ ai i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
where Ci ∈ Rmi×n is the i-th block rows of the output matrix
C, and ai ∈ Rmi is the i-th block elements of the attack vector
a. Even though the attack signal a can be arbitrarily designed
by the adversary, there has been a common rationale that the
number of corrupted sensors are limited due to the limited
attack resources, e.g., [3]. This rationale is formalized as the
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following assumption which implies up to q sensor banks can
be compromised out of N sensor banks.
Assumption 1: The attack signal ai(t) ∈ Rmi is identically
zero for at least N − q indices i ∈ N := {1, 2, · · · , N};
i.e., |{i ∈ N : ai(t) ≡ 0}| ≥ N − q where |·| denotes the
cardinality of a set. 
In this paper, we consider the problem of distributed re-
silient state estimation. The objective is to reconstruct the state
x in a distributed manner, in which the injection of sensor
attack subject to Assumption 1 is identified and excluded, so
that it can not affect the state estimate. More specifically, the
problem is to construct state observers of the form
z˙i = f
z
i (zi, u, yi),
˙ˆxi = f
x
i (xˆi, zi, u, {xˆj}j∈Ni), i ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N},
(2)
so that every estimate xˆi, i ∈ N , recovers the true state x even
under attack. The following descriptions specify the models of
the observers and the adversary:
• The i-th local observer generates a partial estimate zi
based on the information of the input u and the i-th
local output yi, and then yields the estimate xˆi for the
state x based on zi, the input u, and the information of
{xˆj}j∈Ni that are transmitted from the neighbors, where
Ni ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N} is the set of nodes sending their
information to the node i.1
• The model of attack is subject to Assumption 1. In
particular, we consider an omniscient adversary2 and the
non-zero ai(t) might have arbitrary values and is not
assumed to be bounded.
In terms of the attack identification, it will be hopeless if the
majority of the measured output data are compromised, since
the compromised measurements may have arbitrary values. As
investigated in [2], [3], every injection of q attacks can be
identified only when q < N/2, i.e., more than half of the
sensor banks are guaranteed as un-compromised. Especially, it
is investigated in [3] that the resilient state estimation problem
can be solved against every q attacks only if the following
condition of 2q-redundant observability holds, which means
(1a) is observable from any N − 2q banks of measurements.
Assumption 2: For any N ′ ⊂ N = {1, . . . , N} such that
|N ′| = N − 2q, the matrix C ′ which is a stacked matrix of
Ci for i ∈ N ′ satisfies that the pair (C ′, A) is observable. 
1As the estimation is performed in a distributed way, a remark is made that
the plant is not assumed to be observable from a local output yi, in general.
2For example, the signal ai(t) for an attacked node can be generated, with
the knowledge of all parameters and signals in (1) and (2).
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2Under 2q-redundant observability, various solutions to the
problem have been presented, most of which are essentially
based on majority voting; each output measurement (or each
estimate from the measurement) is to be compared with others
and is identified as attack-free only when it coincides with the
majority of measurements. Since the problem is known to be
NP-hard in general and combinatorial in nature [2], reducing
the computational complexity has been one of the most crucial
issues for the existing results. Many efforts have been made
such as relaxation to convex optimizations [3], [4], observer-
based approaches [5]–[8], and utilization of median functions
[9], [10]. However, most of them are centralized schemes and
they still require substantial computational efforts or resources
as the number of sensors increases.
As distributed algorithms have been developed in various
fields of study so as to divide a large computational problem
into small-scale computations, distributed resilient state esti-
mation (or distributed identification of sensor attack) has been
tackled in recent years. Related results can be found as in [8],
[10]–[14], but unfortunately, there is a gap between most of
them and the true meaning of “fully distributed” solutions due
to the lack of distributed majority voting. Rather than present-
ing a majority voting algorithm in a distributed/cooperative
manner, they assume that each local unit can collect a large
number of measurements and then carry out the voting by
itself. As a result, in order to locally identify q sensor attacks,
they assumed that each local unit of sensors contains at least
2q + 1 sensors [8], [13], or has at least 2q + 1 neighboring
sensor nodes [10]–[12]. On the other hand, a fully distributed
attack identification scheme is made in [14], but it is only for
the case when the state has constant scalar value and it assumes
only up to 30% of measurements can be compromised.
In this note, we present a scheme of fully distributed
resilient state estimation for linear dynamical systems, which
also includes a way to identify sensor attacks in a fully
distributed manner. As a “fully distributed” solution, local
observers in the proposed observer network, which takes
the form of (2), do not necessarily collect a majority of
sensor data for the sake of attack identification. And thereby,
there is no need for additional assumptions related to local
identification. In particular, compared with [8], [13], there
is no assumption that every local attack is identifiable from
each local output yi. Especially, we do not assume that each
mi, the number of sensors in the i-th sensor bank, satisfies
mi ≥ 2q + 1. With respect to the sensing redundancy against
q sensor attacks, we only assume 2q-redundant observability
of the overall system, which is also a necessary condition for
resilient state estimation. On the other hand, compared with
[10]–[12], each local observer does not need a majority of
neighbors. We only assume the network connectivity for the
overall communication graph (see Assumption 3), which is a
necessary condition for distributed state estimation.
The algorithm that we use for a distributed majority voting
is a distributed median solver developed in the next section.
The use of (centralized) median functions has been considered
in [9] and [10] to present a fast polynomial-time algorithm for
resilient state estimation. Taking advantage of the recent de-
velopment of “blended dynamics” approach [15], the designed
local observers approximately recover the median of the local
state estimates in a distributed manner. It will be seen that the
median is a resilient estimate of the state even under up to q
corrupted sensor banks. Thanks to one of the merits of blended
dynamics approach [15], the proposed observer is different
from [14] in that it allows the plug-and-play (initialization-
free) operation; that is, the observer can perform resilient state
estimation seamlessly even when some sensor banks or local
observers intermittently join or leave the network as long as
the proposed assumptions are maintained during the operation.
Notation: Laplacian matrix L = [lij ] ∈ RN×N of a
graph is defined as L := D − A, where A = [αij ] is the
adjacency matrix of the graph and D is the diagonal matrix
whose diagonal entries is
∑N
j=1 αij . By its construction, it
contains at least one eigenvalue of zero, whose corresponding
eigenvector is 1N := [1, . . . , 1]T ∈ RN , and all the other
eigenvalues have nonnegative real parts. For undirected graphs,
the zero eigenvalue is simple if and only if the correspond-
ing graph is connected. For vectors or matrices a and b,
col(a, b) := [aT , bT ]T . For matrices A1, . . . , Ak, we denote
by diag(A1, . . . , Ak) the block diagonal matrix. The operation
defined by the symbol ⊗ is the Kronecker product. The maxi-
mum norm of a vector x is defined by ‖x‖∞ := maxi |xi|, and
the Euclidean norm is denoted by ‖x‖ :=
√
xTx. The induced
Euclidean norm of a matrix A is written by ‖A‖. For a set Ξ,
‖x‖Ξ denotes the distance between the vector x and Ξ, i.e.,
‖x‖Ξ := infy∈Ξ ‖x− y‖. An interval [a, b] of real numbers a
and b implies {x : a ≤ x ≤ b}. For a set Z , its cardinality
is denoted by |Z|. The function sgn : R → R denotes the
signum function defined as sgn(s) = s/|s| for non-zero s,
and sgn(s) = 0 for s = 0. For a real number x, rounding
up and down of x is denoted by dxe and bxc, respectively. In
this paper, any solution of a discontinuous dynamical system is
considered as a Filippov solution, any adjacency element αij is
0 or 1, and all positive (semi)definite matrices are symmetric.
II. DISTRIBUTED MEDIAN SOLVER
Despite the general problem we are dealing with in this
paper, let us consider for a moment a simplified problem of
estimating a constant scalar value given the corrupted set of
constant scalar outputs where the attack is assumed to be also a
constant, i.e., x ∈ R, A = 0, B = 0, and yi ∈ R for all i ∈ N
in (1). Then, Assumption 2 implies that there is more than
2q+1 indices i such that Ci is non-zero. Let si be 1 when Ci
is non-zero and 0 otherwise. Since by Assumption 1, there is
at most q indices i such that ai is non-zero, a simple solution
to obtain a resilient estimate of a constant scalar value x is to
take a majority vote among the local estimates zi := yi/Ci for
all the indices i such that si = 1. One particular tool which
makes this happen is a median operation, and by constructing
a distributed median solver, we can thus solve the distributed
resilient state estimation problem for this special case. Thus,
in this section, we propose a distributed median solver, and
in the later section, we will see how this can be extended to
cover the general problem illustrated in the Introduction.
In this section, for a collection Z of real numbers zi, i =
1, 2, · · · , N associated with a collection S of indicators si ∈
3{0, 1}, i = 1, 2, · · · , N (with at least one index i such that
si = 1), a median among the indicated values (zi for i such
that si = 1) is defined as a real number that belongs to the set
MSZ =
{
{zs(S+1)/2}, if S is odd,
[zsS/2, z
s
S/2+1], if S is even,
where S is the number of indicated values, i.e., S := |{i ∈
N : si = 1}|, and zsi ’s are the elements of the set of indicated
values {zi : si = 1} with its index being rearranged (sorted)
such that
zs1 ≤ zs2 ≤ · · · ≤ zsS .
With the help of this relaxed definition of the median, finding
a median x of Z associated with S becomes solving a simple
optimization problem
minimizex
∑N
i=1
si|zi − x|.
Then, the gradient descent algorithm given by
˙ˆx =
∑N
i=1
sisgn(zi − xˆ) (3)
will solve this minimization problem. In particular, the solution
xˆ satisfies
lim
t→∞ ‖xˆ(t)‖MSZ = 0.
Motivated by this, we propose a distributed median solver,
whose individual dynamics of the agent i uses the information
of zi and si only:
x˙i = sisgn(zi − xi) + γ
∑
j∈Ni(xj − xi), i ∈ N , (4)
where γ > 0 is a design parameter.
Now, under a mild assumption on the graph, the algorithm
(4) finds a median approximately by exchanging their states
xi only (not zi nor si).
Assumption 3: The graph is undirected and connected. 
Theorem 1: Let Assumption 3 hold. Then, for each γ > 0,
the solution to (4) from any initial condition xi(0) ∈ R, i ∈ N ,
exists for all t ≥ 0 and satisfies
lim sup
t→∞
‖xi(t)‖MSZ ≤
2
√
N
γλ2(L) , ∀i ∈ N ,
where Z and S are a given set of numbers {zi}i∈N and a given
set of indicators {si}i∈N respectively (with at least one index i
such that si = 1), and λ2(L) is the algebraic connectivity of
the graph (i.e., the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian
matrix L that represents the graph). 
Remark 1: The insight behind the proposed distributed me-
dian solver (4) comes from the so-called ‘blended dynamics’
approach [15]. In this approach, the behavior of heterogeneous
multi-agent systems
x˙i = fi(t, xi) + γ
∑
j∈Ni(xj − xi), i ∈ N ,
with large coupling gain γ is approximately estimated by the
behavior of the blended dynamics defined by
˙ˆx = (1/N)
∑N
i=1
fi(t, xˆ).
In our case, the blended dynamics of (4) is obtained as the
gradient descent algorithm (3) with 1/N scaling in time. 
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 2: The algebraic connectivity λ2(L) depends on
both the topology of the graph and the number N of the nodes.
For example, λ2(L) = 2(1−cos(2pi/N)) for the ring network,
so that it decreases as N increases. On the other hand, for the
all-to-all networks, λ2(L) is the same as the number N [16].
Therefore, if the network graph is all-to-all, the increase of
the node number N actually improves the steady-state error
2
√
N/(γλ2(L)) = 2/(γ
√
N). 
III. DISTRIBUTED RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION
A. Applicable Class of Systems
In this section, we return to our original problem illustrated
in the Introduction, which considers distributed resilient esti-
mation of a high-dimensional time-varying vector x(t) ∈ Rn.
The basic idea in this section is to find a unified coordinate
transformation so that we can perform element-wise median
operation among the partial estimates, generated based on each
output, to obtain a resilient estimate of the whole vector x(t).
For this, with Ui being the unobservable subspace of the pair
(Ci, A) for each i ∈ N , we require the following technical
assumption.
Assumption 4: There exists a basis {v1, . . . , vn} of Rn
such that every Ui, i ∈ N , is a span of a subset of the basis.

The key to the assumption is that the same basis is used
to express all different subspaces Ui. To see how strong/weak
this assumption is, we refer to Appendix B where we list a
few sufficient conditions for Assumption 4. We emphasize,
from Appendix B, that Assumption 4 holds if the characteristic
polynomial and the minimal polynomial of A are the same.
Now let us define an indicator sli such that
sli =
{
1, if vl /∈ Ui,
0, if vl ∈ Ui.
Equivalently, we have sli = 1 if the value w
T
l x is observable
from the sensor bank yi = Cix, where wl ∈ Rn is such that[
w1 · · · wn
]T [
v1 · · · vn
]
= In.
Then, as seen in the following lemma, the 2q-redundant
observability (Assumption 2) implies that each wTl x, l =
1, · · · , n, is observable from at least 2q + 1 sensor banks.
Lemma 1: Let Assumptions 2 and 4 hold. Then, for each
l = 1, . . . , n, it holds that |{i ∈ N : sli = 1}| ≥ 2q + 1. 
Proof: Assume that this is not true. Then, there exist l ∈
{1, . . . , n} and N ′ ⊂ N such that |N ′| = N−2q and vl ∈ Ui
for all i ∈ N ′. Now, this contradicts Assumption 2.
It is then seen that, under Assumptions 2 and 4, resilient
state estimation against up to q sensor attacks is obtained by
element-wise majority voting. In particular, if sli = 1, then one
should be able to design an estimator that yields zli, which is
the estimate of wTl x, from yi = Cix. If we collect all z
l
i, there
are more than or equal to 2q + 1 estimates due to Lemma 1.
This means that, even if up to q sensor banks are corrupted by
adversaries so that up to q estimates become untrustful, there
are still at least q+ 1 trustful estimates. Therefore, a majority
vote from all estimates yields a trustful estimate, and a simple
way to do the majority vote is to take the median of all estimate
4candidates. Then, by collecting these resilient estimates for all
l = 1, 2, · · · , n, each agent achieves resilient estimation of the
whole state x(t). Note that the state observer that uses yi can
be installed at the i-th sensor bank, and therefore, the estimate
zli can be obtained locally. The forthcoming subsections show
how this can be done precisely.
Remark 3: For interested readers, we present another
explanation for the role of Assumption 4. As noted in the
Introduction, 2q-redundant observability is a necessary con-
dition for resilient state estimation. On the other hand, a
well-used sufficient condition is the null-space property [3,
Proposition 6]. It is well-known that under the null-space
property, it is possible to avoid solving NP-hard problems by
equivalently converting the l0 minimization problem into an l1
minimization problem. By recalling that the median operation
illustrated in Section II was considered as an l1 minimiza-
tion problem, we might think that Assumption 4 provides a
connection between the necessary and the sufficient condition.
In fact, unlike the terminology, the null-space property is not
the condition about the null-space (or in the context of this
paper, about the unobservable subspace Ui) and it depends on
the specific choices of matrices even if those matrices have the
same null-space. Now, the role of Assumption 4 is to guarantee
under the necessary condition (2q-redundant observability)
that we can always find a set of matrices that satisfies the null-
space property. Therefore, under Assumptions 2 and 4, we can
solve an equivalent l1 minimization problem (which is to take
the median) to obtain a resilient estimate. A typical choice
of matrices are given in the next subsection, and the null-
space property directly follows from Lemma 1. In this regard,
it seems further studies are required for the gap between the
necessary and the sufficient condition. 
B. Proposed Distributed Resilient State Observer
Putting all the discussions so far together, our design of the
distributed state observer (2) is proposed. With the unobserv-
able subspace Ui of (Ci, A) and the basis {v1, . . . , vn} of As-
sumption 4, let Vi be an n×oi matrix, where oi = n−dim(Ui),
whose columns are vl with vl /∈ Ui, so that the columns of Vi
are a basis of the observable (quotient) subspace of (Ci, A).
Moreover, let Wi be an oi × n matrix, whose rows are wTl
with sli = 1. Then, WiVi = Ioi and we obtain a Kalman
observability decomposition as[Wi
W˜i
]
A
[Vi V˜i] = [∗ 0∗ ∗
]
, Ci
[Vi V˜i] = [∗ 0] ,
where W˜i ∈ R(n−oi)×n and V˜i ∈ Rn×(n−oi) consist of
wTl and vl with s
l
i = 0, respectively such that W˜iV˜i =
In−oi . Design an observer gain matrix Li ∈ Roi×mi such
that WiAVi − LiCiVi is Hurwitz, which is possible since
(CiVi,WiAVi) is observable. Hence, a partial observer for
each i-th sensor bank becomes
z˙i =Wi(AVizi +Bu) + Li(yi − CiVizi) ∈ Roi . (5)
This observer estimates the state as much as possible from the
available information yi. In particular, when the i-th sensor
bank is attack free, i.e., ai ≡ 0, we can estimate wTl x, as a
component of zi in (5), for all l such that sli = 1. However, the
estimate of wTl x from the i-th sensor bank may be corrupted
if yi is corrupted by the attack signal ai. Nevertheless, by
recalling from Lemma 1 that, for each l = 1, 2, · · · , n, there
are at least 2q + 1 sensor banks from each of which we can
estimate wTl x through the partial observer (5), and that there
are up to q sensor attack, it is left to take the median out of all
the estimates for each wTl x, to neglect the corrupted estimates.
Here we note that wTl x(t) to be estimated is time-varying,
and so, the distributed median solver of the form (4) may not
efficiently track wTl x(t). Therefore, inspired by the internal
model principle, our idea is to embed the model for the state
x(t) into the distributed median solver as
˙ˆxi = Axˆi +Bu+ κ
n∑
l=1
slisgn(w
T
l Vizi − wTl xˆi)vl
+ κγ
∑
j∈Ni(xˆj − xˆi) ∈ Rn (6)
where positive gains κ and γ are design parameters. It is noted
that, in (6), the correction of xˆi(t) is performed by the last two
summation terms. In the first summation, the value wTl Vizi is
identically zero for some l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which means that
we cannot estimate wTl x from the output yi. In order not
to perturb the xˆi-dynamics, the indicator sli becomes zero as
well in this case. Then, the correction, in this case, is actually
performed by the second summation; that is, the unobservable
components of xˆi is compensated by the estimates of the
neighboring agents.
The next theorem shows that, for sufficiently large κ and
γ, the distributed algorithm (5) and (6) achieves a resilient
estimation of x with arbitrary precision.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold. Then,
for each compact set K ⊂ Rn+
∑N
i=1(oi+n) and η > 0, there
exist κ∗ and γ∗ such that, for each κ > κ∗, γ > γ∗, and
col(x(0), z1(0), xˆ1(0), . . . , zN (0), xˆN (0)) ∈ K, the solution
to (1), (5), and (6) exists for all t ≥ 0, and satisfies
lim sup
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− x(t)‖∞ ≤ η,
for all i ∈ N . 
Proof: Define the error variables as x¯i := W(xˆi − x) ∈
Rn, where W = col(wT1 , . . . , wTn ). Then, the error dynamics
is given for each i ∈ N as (x¯i = col(x¯1i , . . . , x¯ni ))
˙¯xi = A¯x¯i + κ
 s
1
i sgn(p
1
i − x¯1i )
...
sni sgn(p
n
i − x¯ni )
+ κγ ∑
j∈Ni
(x¯j − x¯i) (7)
where pi = col(p1i , . . . , p
n
i ) := WVizi − Wx ∈ Rn, A¯ =
WAV , and V = [v1, . . . , vn]. Let a matrix R ∈ RN×(N−1)
be a matrix whose columns are orthogonal unit vectors such
that each column is perpendicular to 1N . Then, by defining
x¯avg = col(x¯
1
avg, . . . , x¯
n
avg) := (1/N)
∑N
i=1 x¯i and x˜ := (R
T ⊗
In) col(x¯1, . . . , x¯N ), we have x¯i = x¯avg + (rTi ⊗ In)x˜ where
rTi is the i-th row of R. Therefore, it follows that
˙¯xavg = A¯x¯avg +
κ
N
N∑
i=1
s
1
i sgn(p
1
i (t)− x¯1avg − (rTi ⊗ eT1 )x˜)
...
sni sgn(p
n
i (t)− x¯navg − (rTi ⊗ eTn )x˜)
,
5˙˜x = (IN−1 ⊗ A¯)x˜− κγ(Q⊗ In)x˜
+ κ(RT ⊗ In)

s11sgn(p
1
1(t)− x¯1avg − (rT1 ⊗ eT1 )x˜)
...
sn1 sgn(p
n
1 (t)− x¯navg − (rT1 ⊗ eTn )x˜)
...
snN sgn(p
n
N (t)− x¯navg − (rTN ⊗ eTn )x˜)
,
where the matrix Q := RTLR is positive definite and el is
the elementary vector, i.e., the l-th element of el is one and
all other elements of el are zero.
Now, with W (t) := ‖x˜(t)‖, it is seen that, when W > 0,
W˙ =
x˜T ˙˜x+ ˙˜xT x˜
2
√
x˜T x˜
≤ 1
2W
x˜T (IN−1 ⊗ (A¯+ A¯T ))x˜− κγλmin(Q)W + κ
√
Nn
≤ κ
√
Nn− (κγλ2(L)− ‖A¯‖)W. (8)
Then, with δη := η/(3‖V‖∞), it can be shown that, if
γ >
2κN
√
Nn2 + δη‖A¯‖
κδηλ2(L) =: γ¯(κ),
then we have
W˙ ≤ −κN
√
Nn2
δη
W < 0 when W ≥ δη
Nn
√
n
=: δ′η.
Hence, since all the initial conditions belong to the compact
set K, there are a bound Bw and a time Tw such that W (t) =
‖x˜(t)‖ ≤ Bw for all t ≥ 0, and W (t) = ‖x˜(t)‖ ≤ δ′η for all
t ≥ Tw.
On the other hand, if there is no attack, then it is clear that
limt→∞ pli(t) = 0 for any pair (i, l) such that s
l
i = 1. Since
the initial conditions belong to the compact set K, there are a
bound Bp and a time Tp such that |pli(t)| ≤ Bp for all t ≥ 0
and |pli(t)| ≤ δ′η for all t ≥ Tp.
Now, define a set
θ(x¯avg) := {l ∈ {1, · · · , n} : |x¯lavg| ≥ ‖x¯avg‖∞/(Nn)}
which is non-empty because there is l∗ such that ‖x¯avg‖∞ =
|x¯l∗avg| by definition of the infinity norm. Suppose that x¯avg is
given. For each l ∈ θ(x¯avg), there are at least q+1 indices of i
such that sli = 1 and ai(t) ≡ 0 by Lemma 1 and Assumption 1.
Claim: For such pairs (i, l) (i.e., l ∈ θ(x¯avg), sli = 1, and
ai(t) ≡ 0), if
|pli − (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜| <
‖x¯avg‖∞
Nn
, (9)
then, with V (t) = ‖x¯avg(t)‖,
V˙ ≤ ‖A¯‖V − κ
Nn
√
n
.
Proof of Claim: Since l ∈ θ(x¯avg), we have that |pli − (rTi ⊗
eTl )x˜| < |x¯lavg|, and thus,
N∑
i=1
slix¯
l
avgsgn(p
l
i − x¯lavg − (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜) ≤ −|x¯lavg| (10)
because the number of i’s such that sli = 1 and ai ≡ 0 is at
least one more than the number of i’s such that sli = 1 and
ai 6≡ 0. It follows from (10) that
V˙ ≤ 1
2V
x¯Tavg(A¯+ A¯
T )x¯avg
+
1
V
κ
N
n∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
slix¯
l
avgsgn(p
l
i − x¯lavg − (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜)
≤ ‖A¯‖V + 1
V
κ
N
∑
l 6∈θ
N∑
i=1
1
Nn
‖x¯avg‖∞
+
1
V
κ
N
∑
l∈θ
N∑
i=1
slix¯
l
avgsgn(p
l
i − x¯lavg − (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜)
≤ ‖A¯‖V + 1
V
κ
N
n− |θ|
n
‖x¯avg‖∞ − 1
V
κ
N
∑
l∈θ
|x¯lavg|
≤ ‖A¯‖V + 1
V
κ
N
n− 1
n
‖x¯avg‖∞ − 1
V
κ
N
|x¯l∗avg|
≤ ‖A¯‖V − 1
V
κ
Nn
‖x¯avg‖∞ ≤ ‖A¯‖V − κ
Nn
√
n
where l∗ is such that |x¯l∗avg| = ‖x¯avg‖∞ (both l∗ and θ depend
on x¯avg), and the last inequality follows from that ‖x¯avg‖ ≤√
n‖x¯avg‖∞. This completes the proof of the Claim.
Let M¯ be a constant such that V (0) ≤ M¯ and Bp +Bw ≤
M¯/(Nn
√
n), which exists since all the initial conditions
belong to the compact set K. Then, whenever V > M¯ , we
get for each pair (i, l) which satisfies sli = 1 and ai ≡ 0,
|pli(t)− (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜| ≤
V
Nn
√
n
=
‖x¯avg‖
Nn
√
n
≤ ‖x¯avg‖∞
Nn
.
Then, by the Claim, it is seen that V˙ ≤ ‖A¯‖V , and thus,
V (t) ≤ M¯ exp(‖A¯‖t) for all t ≥ 0.
Let κ∗ := Nn
√
n‖A¯‖M¯exp(‖A¯‖T ) where T :=
max{Tw, Tp}. Then, for any κ > κ∗ and γ > γ¯(κ∗) =: γ∗
(where γ¯(·) is a decreasing function so that γ > γ¯(κ)), we
have that |pli(t)− (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜(t)| ≤ |pli(t)|+ ‖x˜(t)‖ ≤ 2δ′η =
2δη/(Nn
√
n) after the time T for such pairs (i, l) that sli = 1
and ai ≡ 0. Moreover, it follows from the Claim that
V˙ ≤ ‖A¯‖M¯ exp(‖A¯‖T )− κ
Nn
√
n
< 0 if ‖x¯avg‖∞ > 2δη√
n
.
This implies that
lim sup
t→∞
‖x¯avg(t)‖∞ ≤ lim sup
t→∞
V (t) ≤ 2δη,
and finally implies that, for all i ∈ N ,
lim sup
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− x(t)‖∞ = lim sup
t→∞
‖Vx¯i(t)‖∞
≤ ‖V‖∞ lim sup
t→∞
‖x¯avg(t) + (rTi ⊗ In)x˜‖∞ ≤ 3‖V‖∞δη = η.
This concludes the proof.
Remark 4: It is noted that by the cascaded structure of the
local partial state observer (5) and the consensus network (6),
analysis for the case when there are disturbances in the system
and/or noises in the output is not difficult. In this case, it can
be shown that the estimation error cannot be made arbitrarily
small regardless how large the gains are. 
6C. Special Case: Lyapunov Stable System
In this subsection, under the additional assumption that the
system (1) is Lyapunov stable, we show that the result of
Theorem 2 can be extended to a global result so that the initial
condition can have any value and the gains κ and γ can be just
positive numbers. In particular, if there exists P > 0 such that
PA+ATP ≤ 0, then the median solver (6) can be modified
as
˙ˆxi = Axˆi +Bu+ κV
√
P¯−1W
n∑
l=1
slisgn(w¯
T
l Vizi − w¯Tl xˆi)vl
+ κγ
∑
j∈Ni
(xˆj − xˆi) (11)
where P¯ := VTPV and w¯Tl is the l-th row of the matrix√
P¯W . Now, the following holds.
Theorem 3: When the system (1) is Lyapunov stable,
the modified median solver (11) works with (5) under As-
sumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, with any κ > 0, γ > 0, and
col(x(0), z1(0), xˆ1(0), . . . , zN (0), xˆN (0)) ∈ Rn+
∑N
i=1(oi+n).
In particular, the solution to (1), (5), and (11) exists for all
t ≥ 0, and satisfies
lim sup
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− x(t)‖ ≤ (Nn
2 +
√
n)
√
N
γλ2(L)
∥∥∥V√P¯−1∥∥∥
for all i ∈ N . 
Proof: Let x¯i =
√
P¯W(xˆi − x) and pi =
col(p1i , . . . , p
n
i ) =
√
P¯W(Vizi − x). Then, one can show
that (7) still holds with A¯ =
√
P¯WAV
√
P¯−1, which satisfies
A¯+ A¯T ≤ 0.
Now, the rest of the proof proceeds similarly to the proof
of Theorem 2. In particular, the inequality (8) now becomes
W˙ ≤ κ
√
Nn− κγλ2(L)W. (12)
By this, we have
lim sup
t→∞
‖x˜(t)‖ = lim sup
t→∞
W (t) ≤
√
Nn
γλ2(L) .
This means that, for any  > 0, one can find T > 0 such that
‖x˜(t)‖ ≤
√
Nn
γλ2(L) + , ∀t ≥ T. (13)
Now, assume without loss of generality that T is large enough
so that
|pli(t)| ≤ , ∀t ≥ T, (14)
for any (i, l) such that sli = 1 and ai ≡ 0. Then, we have
|pli(t)− (rTi ⊗ eTl )x˜| ≤ |pli(t)|+ ‖x˜(t)‖ ≤
√
Nn
γλ2(L) + 2,
for all t ≥ T and for all such pairs (i, l).
Now, the Claim in the proof of Theorem 2 can be read as
it holds that
V˙ ≤ − κ
Nn
√
n
< 0
if t ≥ T and √
Nn
γλ2(L) + 2 <
V
Nn
√
n
≤ ‖x¯avg‖∞
Nn
.
Thus we obtain
lim sup
t→∞
V (t) ≤ Nn√n
( √
Nn
γλ2(L) + 2
)
.
However, the choice of  is arbitrary, and thus, we get
lim sup
t→∞
‖x¯avg(t)‖ = lim sup
t→∞
V (t) ≤ Nn
2
√
N
γλ2(L) .
Since x¯i(t) = x¯avg(t)+(rTi ⊗In)x˜(t), this concludes the proof.
Since the steady-state error depends only on the parameter
γ, by increasing γ and decreasing κ, we can achieve arbitrary
small steady-state error, while preserving the coupling gain
κγ as a constant. However, as one can find from the proof of
Theorem 3, if κ is small, the convergence rate is also small.
One way of achieving both fast convergence and small steady-
state error is again taking κ and γ sufficiently large.
Meanwhile, by considering Lyapunov stable systems the
method to allow plug-and-play operation noted in the Intro-
duction and the method to identify effective attacks become
much easy. In particular, if each agent knows the upper bound
of the number of agents as N , and if there is a prespecified
goal of steady-state error as s, then each agent can simply take
the parameters as
γ =
‖V
√
P¯−1‖
√
N
4s/(N
2 −N)
(
Nn2 +
√
n
)
, κ =
1
γ
,
to guarantee (since λ2(L) ≥ 4/(N2 −N) [19])
lim sup
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− x(t)‖ ≤ s, ∀i ∈ N ,
with a coupling gain κγ = 1, even when some sensor banks
or local observers intermittently join or leave the network as
long as the proposed assumptions are maintained. Now, if
we additionally assume that the initial condition is in some
compact set K as in Theorem 2, then each agent can calculate
T that guarantees (13) with the prespecified . Then, by each
agent constructing their partial observer fast enough so that
(14) is satisfied for the same T when sli = 1 and ai ≡ 0, they
can also calculate T ′ > T such that
V (t) ≤ Nn√n
( √
Nn
γλ2(L) + 2
)
for all t ≥ T ′. Now, from the time after T ′, each agent
can, by comparing their partial estimates zi(t) with their
resilient estimatesWixˆi(t), find whether their measurement is
corrupted by the effective attack or not. Same ideas also apply
to the general case, however, it requires much more efforts.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed distributed
resilient state estimator, simulation with a three inertia system
7is conducted. Its dynamics (1) is determined by the matrices
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0
− k1J1 − b1J1 k1J1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
k1
J2
0 −k1+k2J2 − b2J2 k2J2 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 k2J3 0 − k2J3 − b3J3

B =

0
1
J1
0
0
0
0
 , C =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 0

where J1 = J2 = J3 = 0.01 kg · m2, b1 = b2 = b3 =
0.007 N · m/(rad/s), and k1 = k2 = 1.37 N · m/rad. Here,
the state variables are x :=
[
θ1 θ˙1 θ2 θ˙2 θ3 θ˙3
]T
, the output
measurements are y :=
[
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ1 − θ2 θ2 − θ3
]T
where
each sensor bank consists of a single sensor, and the system
is being controlled by u = 0.01 sin(0.5t). Note that the pair
(C,A) is 2-redundant observable and satisfies Assumption 4.
The injection gains Li of the partial observer (5) are chosen
appropriately such that the eigenvalues of WiAVi − LiCiVi
are near −1. It is assumed that five agents are connected
through the ring network, and κ = 0.5 and γ = 2 are used
to construct (6). Measurement data injection attack is applied
to the first sensor as a1(t) = pi/3 for t ≥ 10. Fig. 1 shows
state trajectory θ1(t) + θ2(t) + θ3(t), its estimate obtained by
agent 1, and its resilient estimate for all agents, which are
obtained by the proposed network.3 It demonstrates the attack-
resilient property of our estimation algorithm. Final emphasis
is made that under the given network structure it is impossible
for agent 1 to obtain resilient estimates corresponding to
the subspace span{[1 0 1 0 1 0]T , [0 1 0 1 0 1]T } without
a distributed majority voting, i.e., with only the collected
measurements of its neighbors.
Fig. 1. Plot of the state trajectory θ1(t)+ θ2(t)+ θ3(t) (black), its estimate
obtained by agent 1 (red), and its resilient estimate for all agents (blue).
3Note that the attack in this simulation is the so-called ‘zero-dynamics’
attack, and thus, agent 1 could not identify whether it is compromised or not,
by only observing its own measurement.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the assumption of 2q-redundant observability and
the connectivity of the network, a scheme of fully distributed
resilient state estimation is proposed for a class of LTI sys-
tems having a uniform basis for unobservable subspaces of
individual outputs. Once the resilient estimate of the state is
obtained, the attack is also identified by comparing the partial
estimate zi of the local observer and the resilient estimate
Wixˆi. Since particular initialization is not needed for the
algorithm (5) and (6) as seen in Theorem 2, the proposed
scheme is suitable for the plug-and-play operation; that is, as
long as the 2q-redundant observability and the connectivity of
the network is maintained, agents can freely join and leave the
network during the operation. The proposed scheme is fully
distributed in that each local agent estimates the observable
part of the state only, and the unobservable part is provided
from the neighbors. During this process, compromised data by
the attacker are effectively rejected in a distributed way by the
proposed distributed median solver.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the proof of Theo-
rem 3, by noting that, in this special case, we have n = 1,
A = 0, B = 0, mi = 1 for all i ∈ N , κ = 1, and P = 1. In
particular, we have W˙ ≤ √N − γλ2(L)W , and thus
lim sup
t→∞
‖x˜(t)‖ = lim sup
t→∞
W (t) ≤
√
N/(γλ2(L)).
This means that, for any  > 0, one can find T > 0 such that
‖x˜(t)‖ ≤
√
N/(γλ2(L)) + , ∀t ≥ T.
Let z and z be such that MSZ = [z, z] and define
V (xavg) := ‖xavg‖MSZ =

xavg − z, if xavg > z,
0, if xavg ∈ [z, z],
z − xavg, if xavg < z.
Now, suppose that t ≥ T and xavg(t) > z+
√
N/(γλ2(L))+.
Then, xavg(t) + rTi x˜(t) > z, which in turn implies that
|{i ∈ N : xavg(t) + rTi x˜(t) > zi and si = 1}| ≥ d(S + 1)/2e.
Therefore, we get
V˙ = x˙avg(t) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1
sisgn(zi − xavg(t)− rTi x˜(t))
≤ (1/N) (−d(S + 1)/2e+ b(S − 1)/2c) ≤ −1/N < 0.
Similarly, if t ≥ T and xavg(t) < z−
√
N/(γλ2(L))− , then
we again get V˙ ≤ −1/N < 0. Therefore, we obtain
lim sup
t→∞
‖xavg(t)‖MSZ ≤
√
N/(γλ2(L)) + .
However, the choice of  is arbitrary, and thus, we get
lim sup
t→∞
‖xavg(t)‖MSZ ≤
√
N/(γλ2(L)).
Since xi(t) = xavg(t) + rTi x˜(t), this concludes the proof.
B. Illustration of the Applicable System Class
We inspect Assumption 4 in the coordinates where A has
the real Jordan form (see [17]) without loss of generality. For
simplicity, let us first consider the case when all eigenvalues
of A are real.
1) If (Ci, A) is observable for all i ∈ N , Assumption 4
holds with any basis because all Ui’s are {0}. This is the
class of systems considered in [9].
2) If A has distinct eigenvalues, then the Jordan form is a
diagonal matrix. In this case, all the eigenvectors consist
of elementary vectors el. Therefore, Assumption 4 holds
with vl = el, l = 1, . . . , n. The class of systems studied
in [10] belongs to this case.
3) More generally, if the characteristic polynomial of A is
the same as the minimal polynomial of A (or, equiva-
lently, each distinct eigenvalue of A has only one Jordan
block), Assumption 4 holds with vl = el, l = 1, . . . , n.
To see this, without loss of generality suppose that A
is a single Jordan block. Then, Ui is {0} when the first
column of Ci is non-zero, and, if the first k columns of Ci
are all zero, then Ui = span{e1, . . . , ek} [18, Sec. 6.5].
4) Even in the case when there is more than one Jordan
block for an eigenvalue λ, there are cases where Assump-
tion 4 holds. For example, consider
A =
[
λ 0 0
0 λ 1
0 0 λ
]
and C =
[
1 1 ∗
1 −1 ∗
2 2 ∗
]
and suppose that each sensor bank consists of only one
sensor (so that Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, is a single row vector).
In this case, Assumption 4 holds with v1 = [1, 1, 0]T ,
v2 = [1,−1, 0]T , and v3 = [0, 0, 1]T because U1 = U3 =
span{v2} and U2 = span{v1}. However, if C3 = [2, 2, ∗]
is replaced by [1, 2, ∗], then U3 = span{[2,−1, 0]T } so
that there is no basis with which Assumption 4 holds.
This observation indicates that indeed the pathological case
may appear only when the characteristic polynomial of A is
not minimal, as noted in Section III-A.
The above discussion can be extended to the case when A
has complex eigenvalues.
5) Same as the item 1) above.
6) Suppose that A = diag(Λ1, . . . ,ΛD) where Λd is either
λd for real λd or col([α,−β], [β, α]) for λd = α+jβ with
β 6= 0, and D is the number of distinct eigenvalues of A
when the complex conjugate eigenvalues are counted as
one. Then, it is seen that the unobservable subspace Ui is
a span of elementary vectors, by recalling that a complex
mode λ is unobservable if and only if its conjugate mode
λ¯ is unobservable for real matrix A.
7) The argument is the same as the item 3) above except
that, for example, if
A =
[
α −β 1 0
β α 0 1
0 0 α −β
0 0 β α
]
, β 6= 0,
the unobservable subspace Ui is either {0}, span{e1, e2},
or span{e1, . . . , e4} depending on whether the submatrix
of the first two-columns of Ci is non-zero, the first two-
columns are zero but the submatrix of the last two-
columns is non-zero, or all columns are zero, respectively.
8) Similar to the item 4) above, consider the case when
A =
[
0 1 0 0−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0
]
with C =
−1 0 0 11 1 0 00 1 1 0
1 −1 0 0
−1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0

where each sensor bank consists of a single sensor. Then,
Assumption 4 holds with v1 = e3, v2 = e4, v3 =
[0, 1,−1, 0]T , v4 = [1, 0, 0, 1]T . Indeed, one can verify
that U1 = U3 = U5 = span{v3, v4} and U2 = U4 = U6 =
span{v1, v2}. However, if C1 = [−1, 0, 0, 1] is replaced
by [2, 0, 0, 1] for example, Assumption 4 does not hold
anymore since U1 = span{[1, 0, 0,−2]T , [0, 1, 2, 0]T }.
